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The Scope of Judicial Review of Consent Decrees Under the 
Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 
INTRODUCTION 
The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974 (APPA) 1 
opens to public scrutiny and comment consent decrees2 filed in fed-
eral district court by the government as proposed settlements of pub-
lic, civil antitrust suits.3 The APPA also requires a district court to 
determine that such a consent decree is in the public interest4 before 
the court enters the decree as a judgment.5 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1982). The APPA is popularly known as the Tunney Act. 
2. The consent decree has been described as "an order of the court agreed upon by repre-
sentatives of the Attorney General and of the defendant, without trial of the conduct chal-
lenged by the Attorney General, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton 
Act, or related statutes." ANTITRUST SUBCOMM., COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 1ST 
SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPT. OF JUSTICE, ix (Comm. 
Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as 1959 REPORT]. See United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 1 
F.R.D. 424, 426 (N.D. Ohio 1940). See generally Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument 
of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1314 (1959). 
3. Approximately 80% of the antitrust complaints filed by the Justice Department during 
the period between 1955 and 1972 were terminated prior to trial by the entry of a consent 
decree. H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. 
& Ao. NEWS 6535, 6536 [hereinafter cited as 1973 HOUSE REPORT]. See generally 1959 RE-
PORT, supra note 2; M. GOLDBERG, THE CONSENT DECREE: ITS FORMULATION AND USE (Oc-
casional Paper No. 8, Bureau of Business and Economic Research, Graduate School of 
Business Adminstration, Michigan State University, 1962) [hereinafter cited as M. GOLD· 
BERG]; W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88-97, 126-29 (TNEC Monograph No. 
16, 1940); Barnes, The Trial of an Antitrust Case by the Department of Justice: Settlement By 
Consent Judgment, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 235 (Section of Antitrust Law, ABA 1958); 
Dabney, Consent Decrees Without Consent, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 1053 (1963); Dabney,Antitrust 
Consent Decrees: How Protective an Umbrella?, 68 YALE L.J. 1391 (1959); Donovan & McAl-
lister, Consent Decrees in the Eeforcement of Federal Anti-Trust Laws, 46 HARV. L. REV. 885 
(1933); Flynn, Consent Decrees in Antitrust Eeforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53 
IOWA L. REV. 983 (1968); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 
l, 19-34 (1972); Kalodner, Consent Decrees as an Antitrust E'!forcement Device, 23 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 277 (1978); Katz, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration, 53 HARV. L. REV. 415 
(1940); Litvack, Consent Decrees in Government Civil Antitrust Actions, 9 N.Y.L.F. 181 (1963); 
Phillips, The Consent Decree in Antitrust Eeforcement, 18 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 39 (1961); 
Zimmer & Sullivan, Consent Decree Settlements by Administrative Agencies in Antitrust and 
Employment Discrimination: Optimizing Public and Private Interests, 1976 DUKE L.J. 163; 
Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust Consent Decrees, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1967); Com-
ment, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An Antitrust D17emma, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 627 
(1965). 
4. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982). 
5. The consent decree is a '1udicial act," United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 
(1932), which must be entered by the court, S. REP. No. 298, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as 1973 SENATE REPORT], and which has the same legal effect on the defen-
dant as a judgment in a fully litigated action. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. See also notes 
100-01 infra and accompanying text. This Note will not discuss the post-judgment enforce-
ment aspect of a court's review of consent decrees. For a discussion of that topic, see Note, 
Nonparty Eeforcement of Antitrust Consent Decrees Through Contempt Proceedings, 64 GEO. 
153 
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Courts faced with this task have used differing standards of judi-
cial review. Some have been deferential, expressing their reluctance 
to question the Justice Department's wisdom in formulating each 
settlement, at least in the absence of any showing of bad faith or 
malfeasance. 6 However, in one recent decision, United States v. 
American Telephone and Telegraph Co. ,1 a district court subjected a 
consent decree to intense review.8 The AT&T court independently 
determined the conditions necessary to protect its own view of the 
public interest. Then, after closely evaluating the individual terms of 
the proposed settlement, it conditioned approval of the decree on the 
parties' acceptance of modifications that satisfied the court's criteria 
for protecting the public interest.9 This more intense review by the 
AT&T court has created uncertainty over the proper scope of judi-
L.J. 769 (1976). See also Duncan, Post-Litigation Resultingftom Alleged Non-Compliance with 
Government Antitrust Consent .Decrees, 8 W. RES. L. REV. 45 (1956). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.) ("The balancing of 
competing social and political interests affected by a proposed antitrust consent decree must be 
left, in the first instance, to the discretion of the Attorney General. . . . The court's role in 
protecting the public interest is one of insuring that the government has not breached its duty 
to the public in consenting to the decree."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. 
Associated Mille Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29, 42 (W.D. Mo. 1975) ("Indeed, a court's 
power to do very much about the terms of a particular decree, even after it has given the decree 
maximum, rather than minimum, judicial scrutiny, is a decidedly limited power. . . . Power 
to reform the procedures under which consent decrees are actually negotiated is vested in the 
executive and legislative branches, not the judicial."), ajfd., 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir.) ("[T]he 
Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in controlling government litigation and 
in determining what is in the public interest."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); United States 
v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1141-42 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (Where there is no 
claim of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government, the court will not assess the 
wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and accepting a ~nsent decree.); United 
States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 (D. Mass. 1975); cf. Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. 
United States, 366 U.S. 683, 689 (1961) ("(S]ound policy would strongly lead us to decline 
appellants' invitation to assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and 
accepting the 1960 consent decree, at least in the absence of any claim of bad faith or malfea-
sance on the part of the Government in so acting."). 
See also notes 32-36 infra and accompanying text. 
7. 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,979 (D.D.C. 1982), ajfd. mem. sub nom. Maryland v. 
United States, I 03 S. Ct. 1240 (1983). 
8. This Note uses the terms "deferential" and "intense" to represent the polar approaches 
to the scope of judicial review. Neither standard has an exact meaning, nor are the two exhaus-
tive of all possibilities, but the terms serve as useful and contrasting paradigms. A deferential 
court is largely passive; its only independent role is to assure that the parties have complied 
with the procedural requirements of the APPA and perhaps that the government has acted in 
good faith in reaching the settlement. A deferential court is unwilling to substitute its own 
view of adequate relief for the Justice Department's, even if the court believes the Department 
has erred. The Supreme Court's dictum in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 
683,689 (1961), discussed at notes 84-88 infra, exemplifies the deferential standard of review. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the court not only ensures compliance with the proce-
dural requirements but also examines the substance of the decree. The court is willing to 
substitute its own view of adequate relief and of the public interest for the Justice Depart-
ment's, i.e., its determination of the public interest is independent of that made by the Justice 
Department. The approach of the AT&T court exemplifies the intense standard of review. 
9. See notes 37-52 infra and accompanying text. 
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cial review under the APP A. 10 
In the wake of this uncertainty, this Note analyzes the proper 
scope of judicial review of consent decrees. The Note argues that to 
further the policies embodied in the APP A, courts should undertake 
intense review of proposed settlements before entering them as final 
judgments. Both the congressional intent in enacting the APP A and 
the public's interest in effective enforcement of the antitrust laws 
support intense judicial review. The Note then demonstrates that 
the deferential standard that some courts have applied is derived 
mainly from a case that is inapplicable to the review of consent de-
crees. Finally, the Note argues that intense review will not entail 
any significant disadvantages. 
I. THE CURRENT STATUS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSENT 
DECREES UNDER THE APPA 
A. .Description of the AP PA 
The APPA requires the Justice Department to follow certain pro-
cedures when it files a proposed consent decree with the court. Any 
proposed settlement must be accompanied by a "competitive impact 
statement" (CIS), 11 which describes the proposal and its anticipated 
effects on competition. 12 The CIS must also explain the reasons for 
bringing the suit and the violations originally alleged, 13 state the 
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1982; at DIS, col. l; Natl. L.J., Aug. 23, 1982, at 3, col. 
1. Two APPA decisions after AT&T did not adopt its intense standard of review. In United 
States v. American Brands, Inc., 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65,275 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), the court 
followed the "within the reaches of the public interest" standard announced in United States v. 
Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975). See note 41 iefra. TheAmerican Brands court 
also cited the National Broadcasting and Bechtel cases, both examples of judicial deference. 
See nole 6supra. In United States v. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 
65,175, at 71,653 (C.D. Cal.), mod!fied, 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65,088 (C.D. Cal. 1982), 
the court did not discuss the scope of its public interest determination but simply relied on the 
government's "exhaustive explanation" of why the proposed decree would be in the public 
interest. 
1 I. Congress designed the competitive impact statement to help focus the attention of the 
negotiating parties on the factors that Congress has determined should be considered in for-
mulating a decree. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,674 (1972) (statement of Sen. Tunney). In this respect, 
the CIS is much like the environmental impact statement (EIS) required from government 
agencies by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 
(1976). Both the EIS and the CIS require the government to take account of the public interest 
in the early stages of its decisionmaking process. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,676 (1972). In contrast 
with the NEPA EIS, however, the APP A CIS is prepared by the government without the bene-
fit of public input, which under the APPA comes after the CIS is filed. The CIS serves as a 
point of departure for public comment rather than as an informed assessment of the public 
interest as does the EIS. Congress intended the APPA CIS to educate interested members of 
the public about the proposed decree, thereby enabling them to make informed comments on 
and objections to the proposal. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,674 (1972). The public's response, in turn, 
"may well serve to provide additional data, analysis, or alternatives which could improve the 
[proposed decree)." Id. at 31,675. 
12. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b)(3) (1982). 
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)(l), (2) (1982). 
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remedies available to potential private claimants in the event the de-
cree is entered, 14 and give a description and evaluation of alterna-
tives to the proposal actually considered by the Justice 
Department. 15 Both the proposal and the CIS must be filed with the 
district court and published in the Federal Register at least sixty days 
before the effective date of the decree. 16 A summary of the proposal 
and the CIS must be published in newspapers of general circulation 
for seven days over a period of two weeks beginning at least sixty 
days before the effective date of the decree. 17 The public may submit 
written comments regarding the proposal during this period, and the 
Justice Department must file with the court and publish in the Fed-
eral Register responses to such comments. 18 
At the close of the public comment period, and before entering 
the consent decree, the court is required to determine whether the 
entry of the judgment would be in the "public interest." 19 The stat-
ute authorizes the court in its discretion to take testimony of govern-
ment officials or expert witnesses, to appoint a special master, to 
allow intervention or appearance of amicus curiae, and to take any 
other action it deems appropriate20 to help it determine whether the 
settlement is in the public interest.21 
Although the phrase "public interest" is not clearly defined,22 the 
statute lists factors that the court may consider in making its public 
interest determination.23 The first group, listed in 15 U.S.C. 
14. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b)(4) (1982). 
15. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b)(6) (1982). 
16. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b) (1982). 
17. 15 U.S.C. § 16(c) (1982). 
18. 15 U.S.C. § 16(d) (1982). 
19. 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982). 
20. ~5 u.s.c. § 16(f) (1982). 
21. See 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8-9, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONO. & 
AD. NEWS at 6538-39. See also 119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
22. Congress recognized "that the content of the phrase, 'public interest,' is a product of 
judicial construction ... ," thereby granting to courts the power and responsibility to develop 
the definition of "public interest" on a case-by-case basis. 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, 
at 11-12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6542. See also Zimmer & Sulli-
van,supra note 3, at 186 (although the APPA does list factors for the court to consider (see text 
accompanying notes 32-37 infra), "it nevertheless provides the court with no guidance as to 
when a settlement is in the public interest - that is, how the relevant factors are to be weighed 
in the balance."). 
23. The section provides that in making its public interest evaluation, the court may con-
sider-
(I) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged viola-
tions, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration or relief sought, anticipated 
effects of alternative remedies actually considered, and any other considerations bearing 
upon the adequacy of such judgment; 
(2) the impact of entry of such judgment upon the public generally and individuals 
alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including considera-
tion of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial. 
15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982). 
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§ 16(e)(l), contains "competitive"24 factors: the competitive impact 
of the judgment, the anticipated effects of alternative remedies that 
the Department actually considered, and any other considerations 
that bear on the adequacy of the judgment.25 Subsection (e)(2) con-
tains "general public impact"26 factors: the effect of the judgment on 
the public generally and on potential private claimants, including 
consideration of the public benefit to be derived from a determina-
tion of the issues at trial.27 Finally, the APPA does not constrain the 
court to consider the public interest only from the standpoint of par-
ticular antitrust statutes. The court may also take into account "non-
substantive reasons inherent in the process of settling cases through 
the consent decree procedure."28 
24. The language used in this first group evidences a congressional intent to urge an evalu-
ation of the legal and economic implications of a proposed decree from the perspective of the 
antitrust laws. These factors bear on the "competitive impact" of the judgment. The Judiciary 
Committee explained that it substituted the word "competitive" for the word "public" in the 
phrase "public impact" throughout the bill. This substitution was made because: "(a) the 
antitrust laws protect and promote competition; (b) the expertise the Antitrust Division is 
charged by the Congress with institutionalizing focuses on 'competitive' effects .... " 1973 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 6542. 
Therefore, whenever a court evaluates the "competitive impact" of a proposed settlement, it 
should consider the extent to which the proposed relief satisfies the antitrust laws. 
25. The deviation between the relief originally sought and the terms of the decree would 
presumably be an especially significant factor. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: 
Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly efthe Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1973) [hereinafter cited as S. HEARINGS ON 
APPA] (statement of James S. Campbell, attorney, Washington, D.C.). See also United States 
v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn., 307 F. Supp. 617,621 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (The court found "no good 
reason" to reject the decree as contrary to the public interest, particularly since it "provide[d] 
the Government with substantially all the relief that it could have obtained if it had tried the 
case and won."), qffd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 
(1970). 
26. Senator Tunney included this second category to direct the court to "consider both the 
narrow and the broad impacts of the decree." 118 CONG. Rec. 31,675 (1972). "Thus, in addi-
tion to weighing the merits of the decree from the viewpoint of the relief obtained thereby and 
its adequacy, the court is directed to give consideration ... to the effect of entry of the decree 
upon private parties aggrieved by the alleged violation and upon the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws generally." Id 
27. Senator Tunney pointed out two situations in which the public might benefit from a 
determination of the issues at trial. The first would be if the case presented issues of particular 
value as precedent. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,675 (1972). The second would occur if the Govern-
ment were the only party with sufficient resources to obtain a litigated judgment against the 
defendant in a case where the damage to private claimants was significant. Id Since consent 
decrees have no prima facie effect in favor of the plaintiff in subsequent private suits, see notes 
74-76 infra and accompanying text, the removal of the Government as plaintiff through entry 
of such a decree could have a profound impact on the ability of private plaintiffs to recover for 
their injuries. 118 CONG. Rec. 31,675 (1972). Although such a result is a factor that a court 
should consider in evaluating the merits of a decree, the Co=ittee Report on the APP A 
emphasizes that this section is not intended to force the government to go to trial for the 
benefit of potential private plaintiffs. In most instances the interests of private parties can be 
accommodated without the risks and costs of the government going to trial. 1973 House RE-
PORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6538-39. 
28. 1973 House REPORT, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
News at 6542. The Judiciary Co=ittee specifically deleted the words "as defined by law" 
from the original phrase "public interest as defined by law" to allay the fear that the original 
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B. Judicial Review of Consent Decrees 
Courts have approached their statutory duty29 to determine 
whether a proposed decree is in the public interest with varying de-
grees of independence and vigor. Where no objections have been 
raised during the comment period, courts have generally entered the 
judgment as proposed by the parties.30 Some courts faced with third 
party objections have prodded the parties to deal with the objections 
by offering "suggestions" for modification.31 When pressed to make 
the public interest determination, however, most courts have applied 
a passive standard of review.32 These courts have shown considera-
ble deference to the Justice Department's conclusions regarding the 
public interest,33 particularly in cases where the relief embodied in 
the decree mirrors that sought in the original complaint. 34 The 
court, under this approach, must assure only that the Justice Depart-
ment has acted in good faith in reaching a settlement.35 The "bal-
ancing of competing social and political interests" involved in 
settling an antitrust suit is thus "left, in the first instance, to the dis-
cretion of the Attorney General."36 
In sharp contrast to this deferential approach, theAT&T31 court 
engaged in a more exacting scrutiny of the terms of the proposed 
settlement.38 After reviewing comments, briefs, and oral arguments 
phrase might be interpreted to mean public interest as defined by the antitrust laws, which "as 
such would not admit of compromises made for non-substantive reasons inherent in the process 
of settling cases through the consent decree procedures." Id. (emphasis added). 
29. IS U.S.C. § 16(e) (1982) ("Before entering any consent judgment proposed by the 
United States under this section, the court shall determine that the entry of such judgment is in 
the public interest.") (emphasis added). 
30. See Branfman,Anlilrusl Consent .Decrees-A Review and Evaluation of the First Seven 
Years llnder'the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, 27 ANTITRUST BULL. 303, 349 (1982). 
Bui see id. at 349 n.179 (fwo courts requested more information from the parties in light of the 
paucity of public co=ent). 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713 (D. Mass. 1975), discussed in 
Branfman, supra note 30, at 333-34. 
32. See, e.g. , Branfman, supra note 30, at 350 n.182; cases cited in note 6 supra. 
33. See cases cited in note 6 supra. 
34. See, e.g., United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660,666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 
U.S. 1083 (1981); United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127, 1141-45 
(C.D. Cal. 1978). See also Branfman, supra note 30, at 350. 
35. See cases cited in notes 6, 8 supra. 
36. United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 
(1981). See also cases cited in note 6 supra. 
37. United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~64,979 (D.D.C. 
1982), ajfd mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983). 
38. For other examples of a relatively intense scope of review, see cases cited in Branfman, 
supra note 30, at 350 n.180; United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 
(W.D. Pa. 1970); United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432,434 (C.D. Cal. 1967) 
(court rejected the second proposed decree and "outlined certain requirements it believed es-
sential to any decree settling the case"), ajfd mem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968). 
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from numerous third parties concerning the proposed settlement, as 
well as voluminous submissions from the parties themselves,39 the 
court refused to accept the proposal unless the parties agreed to its 
independently developed series of modifications.40 In evaluating the 
proposal, the court purported to follow a relatively deferential stan-
dard requiring the settlement to be" 'within the reaches of the public 
interest.' "41 The court, however, did not interpret this standard as 
requiring deference to the Justice Department; rather, it followed the 
congressional admonition to eliminate ''judicial rubber stamping of 
proposals submitted to the courts"42 by the Justice Department. The 
AT&T court therefore displayed little deference to the Justice De-
partment's views, stating that it would not accept the Department's 
settlement just because the settlement "somehow, and however inad-
equately, deal[t] with the antitrust and other public policy problems 
• • • .''43 Rather, the court demanded a decree that "meets the re-
quirements for an antitrust remedy-that is, ... effectively [opens] 
the relevant markets to competition and [prevents] the recurrence of 
anticompetitive activity, all without imposing 'undue and unneces-
sary burdens upon other aspects of the public interest . . . ."44 
After applying this test to the individual terms of the proposed 
decree, the court concluded that the relief negotiated by the Justice 
Department in several specific areas did not adequately protect the 
public interest. For instance, the proposed decree had prohibited 
39. AT&T, 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,088 n.88, 73,084 n.65. 
40. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,148-49. 
41. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,087 (quoting United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 
716 (D. Mass. 1975)). The Gillette case displayed less deference than the Bechtel and National 
Broadcasting decisions, see note 6 supra, which the AT&T court also cited in support of its 
standard of review. However, the Gille/le court did not go as far as AT&T; the Gille/le court 
adopted an equivocal rather than an intense standard of review. It found that on the one hand, 
"The legislative history shows clearly that Congress did not intend the court's action to be 
merely pro forma, or to be limited to what appears on the surface. Nor can one overlook the 
circumstances under which the act was passed, indicating Congress' desire to impose a check 
... on the government's expertise .... " 406 F. Supp. at 715. But the court also found sup-
port for a deferential approach in the congressional admonition to review in " 'the least com-
plicated and least time-consuming means possible.'" 406 F. Supp. at 715 (quoting 1973 HousE 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6539). Faced 
with what it regarded as conflicting co=ands, the Gille/le court adopted an equivocal stan-
dard of review: 
It is not the court's duty to detefmine whether this is the best possible settlement that 
could have been obtained if, say, the government had bargained a little harder. The 
court is not settling the case. It is determining whether the settlement achieved is within 
the reaches of the public interest. 
406 F. Supp. at 716. The court's further resolution to "look at the overall picture not hypercrit-
ically, nor with a microscope, but with an artist's reducing glass," id., may be picturesque, but 
it too fails to offer much guidance. 
42. AT&T, 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,085. 
43. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,087. 
44. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,089. 
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Bell Operating Companies45 from marketing equipment for use on 
customers' premises.46 Although theAT&T court agreed that in the-
ory such a restriction would operate to prevent anticompetitive be-
havior,47 the court disagreed with the Justice Department's 
prediction that such anticompetitive behavior would actually occur 
in this case in the absence of such a restriction.48 
The court modified the decree to exclude the marketing restric-
tion and required the Justice Department to accept the modification 
as a condition of the court's approval of the decree.49 The court im-
posed this condition even though it made no finding of bad faith or 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Justice Department in includ-
ing the marketing restriction in the decree. so The court thus engaged 
in a much more intense review than merely determining whether the 
proposed decree was ''within the reaches of the public interest";51 it 
abandoned the established practice of according deference to the 
Justice Department in reviewing proposed consent decrees.52 
II. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR INTENSE AND INDEPENDENT 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROPOSED CONSENT DECREES 
In enacting the APPA, Congress sought to establish "indepen-
dent"53 judicial review of proposed consent decrees. As the previous 
45. The most significant provision of the decree removed from the Bell System the function 
of supplying local telephone services by divesting AT&T of its twenty-two Operating Compa-
nies that performed that function. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,095-101. This divestiture "will 
make it impossible, or at least unprofitable, for AT&T to engage in anti-competitive practices," 
because AT&T will no longer be able to disadvantage competitors in the inter-exchange and 
equipment markets by its close ties with the local Operating Companies. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 
73,099. The divestiture will also further the antitrust goal of preventing excessive concentration 
of economic power in one company. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,097-98. 
46. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,120. 
47. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,120. 
48. 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,120. The court felt justified under the APPA to substitute its 
own judgment for that of the Justice Department, an indication of the intensity of its review. 
See note 8 supra. 
49. The fact that the court removed a restriction from the Operating Companies' burden is 
relevant in evaluating the tow degree of deference that Judge Greene displayed to the Justice 
Department. Several courts have questioned whether the Justice Department negotiated 
enough relief.see, e.g., United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432,434 (C.D. Cal. 
1967) (second proposed decree), qffd mem. sub nom. Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968), but theAT&T case may be the first time a court has questioned the 
Justice Department for negotiating too much relief. Judge Greene evaluated each provision of 
the decree from the standpoint of the public interest without regard to whether his modifica-
tions would be "more lenient" on the defendants than the Justice Department's proposal. This 
approach supports the conclusion that his evaluation was truly independent of the Justice De-
partment's and highlights the low degree of deference paid to the views of the Department. 
50. Compare the cases cited in note 6 supra (suggesting a deferential, good faith standard 
for judicial review). 
51. See note 41 supra. 
52. See cases cited in note 6 supra. 
53. 1973 SENATE REPoRT, supra note 5, at 4; see also 119 CoNo. REC. 3452 (1973) (state-
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section illustrates, however, most courts faced with proposed settle-
ments have instead deferred in large degree to the Justice Depart-
ment's conclusions regarding the public interest. Such a deferential 
approach ignores the legislative history of the APPA and runs con-
trary to the goals of APPA public interest review. The protection of 
the public interest through APP A review can best be accomplished 
by a completely independent, intense, and thorough judicial assess-
ment of the proposed settlement. 
A. The Legislative History of the AP PA 
The legislative history of the APP A contains a congressional 
mandate to increase the intensity of judicial review of proposed con-
sent decrees. Congress was dissatisfied with the prior consent decree 
practice54 and sought to improve it by correcting several specific 
abuses. The first major abuse was the "excessive secrecy" that 
shrouded the negotiation of consent decrees.55 This secrecy generally 
undermined public confidence in the consent decree process, 56 and 
specifically covered up errors or improprieties committed by the Jus-
tice Department.57 The public notice and comment procedures de-
ment of Sen. Tunney) ("[The court] has an independent duty to assure itself that entry of the 
decree will serve the interests of the public .... "). 
54. The legislative history of the APP A refers to a number of settlements as "blatantly 
inequitable and improper." 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973). See also 120 CONG. REC. 36,342-
43 (statement of Rep. Holtzman); 120 CONG. REc. 36,345 (1974) (statement of Rep. Gunter); 
S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 76, 120, 142-43; Consent .Decree Bills: Hearings on 
H.R. 9203, H.R. 9947, and S. 782 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., !st Sess. 162-68 (1973) [hereinafter cited as H. 
HEARINGS ON APPA]. 
55. 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
56. See 120 CONG. REc. 36,342 (1974) (statement of Rep. Seiberling); 120 CONG. REC. 
36,343 (1974) (statement of Rep. Mezvinsky); 120 CONG. REC. 36,343-44 (1974) (statement of 
Rep. Jordan); cf. 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6-7, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6536-37 (APPA designed to improve public confidence). 
57. Regardless of the ability and negotiating skill of the Government's attorneys, they 
are neither omniscient nor infallible. The increasing expertise of so-called public interest 
advocates and for that matter the more immediate concern of a defendant's competitors, 
employees, or antitrust victims may well serve to provide additional data, analysis, or 
alternatives which could improve the outcome. 
119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney); see also 118 CONG. REC. 31,675 
(1972) (statement of Sen. Tunney). Judge Skelly Wright, in his testimony during congressional 
hearings on the APPA, articulated the same concern: 
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, while no doubt among the most 
competent and dedicated groups of professionals in Government service, nevertheless is 
made up of human beings and, unfortunately, human beings occasionally make mistakes. 
In approving a particular decree, the Justice Department attorneys may overlook cer-
tain issues, ignore certain concerns, or misunderstand certain facts. 
s. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 146. 
In addition to the possibility of mistake, the Justice Department might be swayed by the 
"great influence and economic power" wielded by the parties with whom it negotiates. 1973 
SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5; 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1974 
U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6537. See also 120 CONG. REC. 36,341 (1974) (statement of 
Rep. McC!ory). 
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scribed above were designed to remedy the problem of secrecy. 
Eliminating the problem of secrecy would have been only half a 
solution without also addressing the problem of 'judicial rubber 
stamping" of proposed settlements.58 A major purpose of the public 
comment procedures is to provide an opportunity to correct innocent 
or culpable errors of the Justice Department, an opportunity that is 
wasted by a deferential court. 59 Instead, the APP A casts the court in 
an independent role as legal guardian of the public interest. 60 The 
APPA public notice and comment procedures do not come into play 
until after the government and the defendant have concluded their 
negotiations and have lodged a proposed settlement with the court.61 
As a result, the statute does not require62 the government to consider 
specific interests or complaints of third parties and of the public gen-
erally during the negotiation stage. 63 Only after a settlement has 
been reached can the public voice its objections. Although in several 
cases the Justice Department has responded to public comments by 
renegotiating a particular decree, 64 only the court has the power to 
force the Department to consider the public's comments by refusing 
to enter a decree until the concerns are assuaged.65 If the court sim-
58. "One of the abuses sought to be remedied by the bill has been called ~udicial rubber 
stamping' by district courts of proposals submitted by the Justice Department." 1973 HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6538. 
59. Senator Tunney complained that "too often in the past district courts have viewed their 
rules [sic-roles] as simply ministerial in nature - leaving to the Justice Department the role of 
determining the adequacy of the judgment from the public's view." 119 CONG. REC. 3452 
(1973). 
60. The mandate is phrased first in general terms: Before entering any consent judg-
ment, the court shall determine that entry of that judgment is in the public interest. 
The mandate is a highly significant one because it states as a matter of law that the 
role of the district court in a consent decree proceeding is an independent one. The court 
is not to operate simply as a rubber stamp, placing an imprimature [sic] upon whatever is 
placed before it by the parties. Rather it has an independent duty to assure itself that 
entry of the decree will serve the interests of the public generally. 
119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
61. 15 u.s.c. § 16(b) (1982). 
62. The requirement of a competitive impact statement puts some pressure on the negotiat-
ing parties to consider the public interest during the negotiations. See note 63 infra and ac-
companying text. Without the benefit of public commentary, however, their ability to assess 
accurately the many facets of the public interest may be limited. 
63. One witness during the House APP A hearings suggested that Congress provide for 
public co=ent to be directed toward the Justice Department rather than the court. See H. 
HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 168 (testimony of Miles W. Kirkpatrick, attorney and 
former chairman of the FTC). Representative Polk countered that such an arrangement could 
not ensure that the Justice Department would seriously consider the public comments, id. at 
177, and the idea was ultimately rejected. 
64. See Branfman, supra note 30, at 330-31; H. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 85. 
65. The only power the court is given in equity and under the APPA is to refuse to enter a 
decree that is not in the public interest. Some courts, however, have used this power as lever-
age to prod the parties into renegotiating. See note 31 supra and accompanying text. At least 
one court, namely Judge Greene in the AT&T case, overcame the limits on this power by 
stating that he would only accept a decree that included his specific modifications. See notes 
37-52 supra and accompanying text. 
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ply defers to the Justice Department, it abrogates its duty as protec-
tor of the public interest. Congress thus required the court "to make 
a positive finding that the decree is in the public interest" in order to 
remedy the abuse of judicial rubber stamping.66 
B. Judicial Protection of the Public Interest 
In addition to the specific concerns emphasized in the legislative 
history of the APP A, several inherent features of the consent decree 
process also support independent and thorough judicial review. 
Consent decrees may have a great impact on the public at large 
through their regulation of industrial conduct, deterrence of antitrust 
violations, and permanence. Given this importance, it is imperative 
that proposed consent decrees receive intense judicial scrutiny. 
First, consent decrees often create a "follow-the-leader"67 effect 
in a particular industry, effectively setting the standard of conduct 
for the entire industry.68 Senator Tunney recognized that the wide-
spread use69 of consent decrees to enforce our antitrust laws could 
"have a very profound effect on the lives of every citizen of this 
country," since "[t]he decision to settle a case, and the components of 
that settlement, may affect the price, the quantity, and the quality of 
the most basic commodities."70 
Second, consent decrees have a significant effect on the deter-
rence of antitrust violations. A consent decree all but eliminates the 
possibility that a company engaged in practices of doubtful legality 
will be held liable for resulting injuries to competitors in private 
treble damages suits.71 Under section 5 of the Clayton Act,72 a final 
judgment entered after trial in a public antitrust case may be used by 
private claimants in treble damage suits as prima facie evidence 
against the defendant as to all matters that would be estopped be-
tween the government and the defendant. 73 Consent decrees entered 
66. District court judges shall be required to find that each proposed consent judgment is 
in the public interest. The courts will thus be required to make a positive finding that the 
decree is in the public interest . . . . 
The committee believes this requirement will serve to remedy the so-called rubber-
stamping practice. It is hoped that flexible judicial procedure will evolve in the process of 
correcting judicial rubberstamping. 
120 CONG. REc. 36,344 (1974) (statement of Rep. Jordan). 
67. Kalodner, supra note 3, at 278-79: "When industry leaders have entered consent de-
crees, others in the affected industry tend to conform to the decree .... " 
68. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
69. See note 3 supra. 
70. 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
71. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. 
72. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982). 
73. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. 
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before testimony is taken do not have this prima facie effect.74 With-
out the aid of the government's judgment as prima facie evidence, a 
private claimant will find it extremely difficult to succeed in his 
treble damage action.75 Thus, with the entry of a consent decree so-
ciety loses the strongest deterrent in the antitrust laws. Finally, the 
loss of the prima facie effect concomitantly deprives private citizens 
of a means· for recouping their losses that result from the antitrust 
violations.76 Since a consent decree may in practice constitute the 
only remedy against an antitrust defendant's conduct,77 a court 
should be certain that it sufficiently protects the public interest.78 No 
other means of protection are likely to be forthcoming. 
The third reason for intense judicial scrutiny of proposed settle-
ments serves to reinforce the first two. Consent decrees are perma-
nent and have the same collateral estoppel and res judicata effects 
against the government as do litigated judgments.79 If the govern-
ment later wishes to modify a consent decree over the objection of 
the defendant, the government must satisfy the stringent standard 
established in United States v. Sw!ft & Co. :80 
Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by new 
and unforeseen conditions should lead us to change what was decreed 
74. IS U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982). 
Consent decrees will typically state that the parties have consented to entry without admit-
ting any facts or legal conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Halliburton Co., 1976-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,954, at 69,225 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
75. See, e.g,, 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 24. ("Because of the protracted nature of 
antitrust litigation, with the expense and complexity of proof of the legal and economic issues 
involved, it is difficult at best for a private citizen to prosecute to conclusion an action under 
the antitrust laws. When the private litigant is deprived of the use of the Government's decree 
as prima facie evidence, moreover, a private action becomes virtually impossible to main-
tain."); see also 119 CONG. REC. 345 l (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney) ("As a practical mat-
ter because of the protracted nature of antitrust litigation, and the deep pockets of many 
corporate defendants, few private plaintiffs are able to sustain a case in the absence of parallel 
litigation by the Justice Department."); M. GOLDBERG, supra note 3, at 68. 
76. 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 22-24. Society also loses the value of a litigated judg-
ment as precedent for future antitrust cases. 118 CoNG. REC. 31,675 (1972) (statement of Sen. 
Tunney). Although potential violators within an industry may adjust behavior to account for 
policies articulated through a consent decree against a competitor, the incentive to conform 
anticompetitive conduct would presumably be greater in the face of legal precedent. 
77. Senator Tunney expressed concern that "a bad or inadequate consent decree may as a 
practical matter foreclose further review of a defendant's practices both inside and outside the 
scope of the decree." 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973). 
78. As Senator Tunney argued, "[g]iven the enormous amount of time and resources de-
voted to the prosecution of most antitrust suits, it is both logical and necessary that the end 
result be as carefully considered as possible." 119 CONG. REC. 3452 (1973). 
79. See, e.g., Curry v. Curry, 79 F.2d 172, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1935) ("For a consent decree, 
within the purview of the pleadings and the scope of the issues, is valid and binding upon all 
parties consenting, open neither to direct appeal nor collateral attack. 'A fortiori, neither party 
can deny its effect as a bar of a subsequent suit on any claim included in the decree.'") (quot• 
ing Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 113 U.S. 261, 266 (1885)); see 
also 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3. 
80. 286 U.S. 106 (1932). 
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after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned.81 
This rigorous standard has made the modification of decrees after 
entry virtually impossible. 82 Because any error is likely to be irre-
versible, a court should intensely scrutinize proposed settlements to 
ensure that they adequately protect the public interest. 83 
C. The Inapplicable Rationale for Judicial .Deference 
Courts applying a deferential standard of review have ignored 
relevant provisions in the legislative history of the APP A and the 
policy reasons favoring intense review. Instead, these courts have 
relied on Supreme Court dictum in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United 
States84 as support for their reluctance to add their independent 
judgment to the settlement process.85 In Sam Fox, the Supreme 
Court upheld a district court's decision to deny intervention as of 
right to private parties who claimed that the government, in negoti-
ating and accepting a consent decree, had inadequately protected 
their interests. 86 The Court said: 
[S]ound policy would strongly lead us to decline appellants' invitation 
to assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and 
accepting the 1960 consent decree, at least in the absence of any claim 
of bad faith or malfeasance on the part of the Government in so 
acting.87 
Although Sam Fox predated the APPA and dealt with intervention 
rather than review of consent decrees, some courts have concluded 
that its policy of deference to the Justice Department also applies to 
APP A cases. 88 
81. 286 U.S. at 119. 
82. See, e.g., Note, Construction and Mod!ftciation of Antitrust Consent .Decrees: New Ap-
proaches After the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 77 C0LUM. L. REV. 296, 302-
03 (1977). 
83. Senator Tunney was sensitive to this concern when he proposed the APP A: 
[T)he submission of the proposed decree to the court and its subsequent embodiment in a 
jud~ent lends a permanence that endures long after the passing of a particular adminis-
tration of the Department. · 
118 CONG. REC. 31,675 (1972). See also note 77 supra. 
84. 366 U.S. 683 (1961). 
85. See note 88 infra. 
86. 366 U.S. at 689. 
87. 366 U.S. at 689. 
88. The court in United States v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 29 (W.D. 
Mo. 1975), qffd, 534 F.2d 113 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976), concluded that its 
duty under the APP A to determine whether the proposed settlement was in the public interest 
was merely "an accurate codification of the existing case law." 394 F. Supp. at 44. The court 
was thus "convinced that lower federal courts must follow the guidance of the dictum of (Sam 
Fox)." 394 F. Supp. at 41; see note 87 supra. It was "equally convinced that Swift & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 311, 331-32, 48 S.Ct. 3.11, 317, 72 L.Ed. 587 (1928), still states the 
applicable standard in regard to the broad scope of the Attorney General's discretion, i.e., 'His 
authority to make determinations includes the power to make erroneous decisions as well as 
correct ones.'" 394 F. Supp. at 41. The Milk Producers court believed that this interpretation 
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A close reading of Sam Fox, however, reveals that its holding 
and primary rationale do not apply to approval of proposed consent 
decrees. The Sam Fox court based its denial of the appellants' re-
quest to intervene on the ground that the appellants were not bound 
by the parts of the decree to which they objected and sought inter-
vention to challenge.89 Hence, they could enforce their rights in pri-
vate litigation.90 This holding on the standard for third-party 
intervention naturally does not control or address the proper judicial 
role in reviewing proposed consent decrees, and its rationale also 
loses force when taken out of context. The general public is deeply 
affected by consent decrees,91 and it is the public interest that the 
court is charged with determining before it enters a decree. More-
over, the Supreme Court itself recognized in Sam Fox that, as a 
practical matter, even any further private relief is highly unlikely,92 
was supported by the legislative history of the APPA, but the passages it cited merely help 
delineate the boundaries of the court's inquiry without addressing the scope of that review. 
See 394 F. Supp. at 44-45. Furthermore, the Milk Producers court totally ignored the repeated 
mentions in the legislative history that the APPA was designed to correct the abuse of judicial 
rubber-stamping, which was equated with judicial deference to the Attorney General. See 
notes 58-60 supra. 
The court in United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C,D. Cal. 
1979), similarly concluded that the Sam Fox policy of deference "continues to apply with 
equal force even after enactment of the [APPA]." 449 F. Supp. at 1141. In addition to relying 
on the district court's opinion in Milk Producers for this conclusion, the NBC court also cited 
part of the Eighth Circuit's Milk Producers opinion (449 F. Supp. at 1141-42): 
It is axiomatic that the Attorney General must retain considerable discretion in con-
trolling government litigation and in determining what is in the public interest. Thus, in 
our view, the intervention standard remains that which was stated in Sam Fox: "[B]ad 
faith or malfeasance on the part of the government" in negotiating and accepting a con-
sent decree must be shown before intervention will be allowed. 366 U.S. at 689. 
United States v. Associated Millc Producers, 534 F.2d 113, 117 (8th Cir. 1976) (emphasis 
added), qffg. 394 F. Supp. 29, 44 (W.D. Mo. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). This 
passage certainly conveys a deferential tone, but reliance on it for the appropriate scope of 
review is misplaced. First, it only speaks to the standard for a third party to intervene, not to 
the scope of a court's review of a proposed consent decree. Second, the Eighth Circuit passage 
itself reflects confusion of Sam Fox's intervention holding and its policy dictum. Compare 
Sam Fox, 366 U.S. at 689, with id. at 690-93. 
Contrary to these conclusions by the Milk Producers and NBC courts, the AT&T court 
correctly observed that in enacting the APPA "Congress rejected case law to the effect that 
courts should not 'assess the wisdom of the Government's judgment in negotiating and ac-
cepting [a] consent decree.'" AT&T, 1982-2 Trade Cas. at 73,085 n.74 (quoting Sam Fox, 366 
U.S. at 689). See also Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 208, 210 ("[U]ntil recently, courts 
routinely rubber-stamped proposed decrees . . . largely due to doubts about the wisdom of 
reviewing Justice Department determinations. [The APPA], however, establishes a contrary 
public policy." (footnotes omitted) ... The Milk Producers "court's approach seems funda-
mentally misconceived.''). 
89. 366 U.S. at 689. 
90. 366 U.S. at 689. 
91. For example, in the AT&T case the structural relief negotiated by the Justice Depart-
ment and approved by the court will have enormous impact on consumer phone rates nation-
wide. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1983, at 29, col. I; id., Feb. 12, 1983, at 29, col. I; see also 
notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text. 
92. [A]ppellants argue that even should they not be legally precluded from bringing a 
private action, nevertheless the very existence of the outstanding decree would as a matter 
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although private parties are technically not bound by consent de-
crees.93 Thus, a decision to enter a proposed decree, unlike a denial 
of intervention, is a final94 disposition of the rights of the public. 
The dictum in Sam Fox, however, suggests an additional ration-
ale for deference: deference because the decisionmaker is another 
branch of the government. The government's decision to enter into a 
consent decree is "an administrative decision and . . . a part of the 
implementation of the general policy of the Executive branch of gov-
ernment."95 Courts have historically been reluctant to review in-
tensely the discretionary decisions of administrative bodies,96 
including the decisions of the Justice Department to settle antitrust 
cases via consent decrees.97 
of comity either preclude further relief or operate to limit the relief some future- equity 
court might decree. Although there is no reason why such a court need consider the 
present decree as anything but a minimum towards insuring broader representation and 
more favorable income distribution should a claim for further relief be made out, there is 
considerable weight to the argument that the court will feel constrained as a matter of 
comity to at least build on the foundations of the present decree. 
366 U.S. at 694. 
93. A consent decree bars private parties from suing for injunctive relief, but does not bar 
private treble damage suits. Thus competitors will be bound to the structural relief approved in 
the decree, and the defendant's conduct will also be effectively insulated from private damage 
claims. See notes 76-78 supra. 
94. Once a consent decree is entered, it is not subject to modification without the consent of 
the parties absent some unusual change of circumstance. See notes 80-83 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
95. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Assn., 307 F. Supp. 617, 620 (C.D. Cal. 1969), ajfd. 
per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970). 
96. See, e.g., United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1961); Note, The l'IT .Dividend.· 
Reform of .Department of Justice Consent .Decree Procedures, 73 CoLUM. L. REV. 594, 600 
(1973) [hereinafter cited as l'IT .Dividend]. 
97. See l'IT .Dividend, supra note 96, at 600, 610. This absence of judicial involvement in 
the consent decree process prompted the 1959 House Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monop-
oly to remark: 
[T]he judicial function has been superseded by an administrative procedure in which 
there are no administrative rules to safeguard the interests of the public or the interest of 
parties not privy to the Government's case. The consent decree practice has established 
an orbit in the twilight zone between established rules of administrative law and judicial 
procedures. 
1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. 
During congressional hearings on the APP A, several critics of the proposed act questioned 
the propriety of empowering a judicial body to engage in the traditionally "executive" function 
of determining the public interest. See, e.g., H. HEARINGS ON APP A, supra note 54, at 205 
(testimony of Milton Handler, Professor of Law, Columbia Univ.). Representative Hutchin-
son objected that the APPA "imposes on the courts what is essentially a nonjudicial function. 
In short, the courts will have to decide whether the Department of Justice has exercised its 
prosecutorial discretion to settle antitrust cases as well as it should. . . . In my opinion, such a 
process is foreign to the judicial function." 120 CONG. REC. 36,340 (1974). Representative 
Hutchinson further objected: 
[T]o require federal courts to determine whether a consent decree is in the public interest 
is to transfer an "executive" question to the courts for resolution. The question for the 
court will be whether the Department of Justice has exercised its prosecutorial discretion 
well or, perhaps, as well as possible. The question will not be whether the Department 
has violated some legal standard. For none is established by this legislation. Rather, the 
court is given a plenary and unqualified authority to re-decide an executive decision. 
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This argument for deference, based on separation of powers, is 
flawed, however, because it fails to distinguish between the Justice 
Department's negotiation of a proposed settlement and a court's en-
try of a consent decree. Although negotiations involve "administra-
tive decisions" by the Justice Department, a court's entry of a 
consent decree is an exercise of a constitutional98 and statutory99 ju-
1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 21, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
6545 (Additional Views of Rep. Hutchinson) (emphasis in original). Representative Hutchin-
son argued that the legislative and executive branches, which are accountable to the electorate 
rather than the courts, should determine what is ''wise or good for the American people." Id. 
In dissenting from the Supreme Court's su=ary affirmance of the AT&T decision, Justice 
Rehnquist agreed with Representative Hutchinson that the "question assigned to the district 
courts by the Act is a classic example of a question co=itted to the Executive." Maryland v. 
United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240, 1243 (1983), qffg. United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 1982-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~64,979 (D.D.C. 1982). 
This objection concerning delegation of an executive function to the judiciary goes beyond 
the issue of the appropriate scope of judicial review. It goes to the constitutionality of the 
APPA. If the Supreme Court found the objection persuasive, it would declare the public inter• 
est determination required by the APPA unconstitutional, regardless of the standard of review. 
The fatal flaw, if any, lies in the question the APPA asks the courts to answer, not in the way in 
which the courts go about answering that question. Since under Justice Rehnquist's view the 
judiciary cannot constitutionally make the public interest determination, neither the standard 
of the AT&T court nor "any other standard the District Court could have devised, admits of 
resolution by a court exercising the judicial power established by Article III of the Constitu-
tion." 103 S. Ct. at 1242 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
98. The Constitution grants courts the power to decide "Cases, in ... Equity, arising 
under ... the Laws of the United States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. One co=entator has 
argued that delegation of the public interest determination to the judiciary violates the consti-
tutional doctrine of separation of powers. H. HEARINGS ON APPA,supra note 54, at 205 (testi-
mony of Milton Handler, Professor of Law, Columbia Univ.). See also note 97 supra. 
The separation of powers doctrine prohibits one branch of government from acting in such 
a way as to prevent another branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. 
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). The separation of powers 
doctrine was originally premised on the notion that "each of the three general departments of 
government [must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indi• 
rect, of either of the others." Humphrey's Exr. v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). The 
Supreme Court took a "more pragmatic, flexible approach" to separation of powers in Nixon, 
supra, "reject[ing] the argument that the Constitution contemplates a complete division of 
authority between the three branches." 433 U.S. at 442-43. Rather, as the Court held in Nixon, 
the test of whether the proper balance between the coordinate branches is disrupted by partic-
ular action focuses on the "extent to which it prevents the [other] Branch from accomplishing 
its constitutionally assigned functions." 433 U.S. at 443. 
Three arguments militate against the application of the separation of powers doctrine here. 
First, the Supreme Court had a chance to strike down the public interest provision of the 
APPA in theAT&T case but refused to do so, su=arily affirming the district court instead. 
See note 97 supra. Second, judicial review of proposed consent decrees does not necessarily 
"prevent[) the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions." 
Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443. If a court refuses to enter a consent decree, the Justice Department 
merely loses but one enforcement option. The Department may still litigate the case, dismiss 
the case, or settle the case by contract with the defendant. More importantly, the Department 
can still renegotiate the decree and resubmit it for court approval. Thus, the court does not 
prevent the Justice Department from enforcing the antitrust laws. 
Third, the decree is subject to the court's inherent equitable power. See notes IO 1-03 1iifi'a. 
In reviewing a proposed settlement, the court exercises its inherent power. Unless this power is 
meaningless, the court's exercise of it cannot be an encroachment on the executive branch. 
Indeed, a denial of the court's power to refuse to enter decrees that do not protect the public 
interest might itself represent an unconstitutional infringement on judicial power under the 
standard laid down in Nixon. Such a denial would arguably prevent the court from accom• 
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dicial function. Since entry of a consent decree is a judicial act, 100 
the decree is subject to the court's equitable power to refuse to enter 
any judgment not "equitable and in the public interest."101 Thus, 
even apart from the APPA, the court's inherent equitable power 
"over [its] own process, to prevent abuse, oppression and injus-
tice"102 obviates the need for deference to the executive branch. The 
court inherently possesses the power to review consent decrees inten-
sively in making its public interest determination.103 
By entering a consent decree, a court concludes, pursuant to its 
equitable responsibility, that the decree protects the public interest. 
A Sam Fox standard, whereby a court would refuse to enter a decree 
only if there were some evidence of bad faith on the part of the gov-
ernment, would be an abdication of that responsibility. 104 For a con-
plishing its constitutionally assigned function of enforcing the laws of the United States as a 
court of equity. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
99. Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), and Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982), invest the district courts with jurisdiction "in equity to prevent and 
restrain . . . violations" of the Acts. This equitable power to issue decrees extends to consent 
judgments. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928). See also Katz, supra note 3, at 
416-17. 
100. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115 (1932). See also Pope v. United States, 
323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944); note 5 supra. 
Presumably, the Justice Department could settle its cases by contract with the defendant. 
The Department insists, however, that all agreements be embodied in a court order. See /'IT 
Dividend, supra note 96, at 613. In one case, the Department informed the court that "it was 
its policy not to accept stipulations unless 'So Ordered' [although] [t]he Government does not 
question the sincerity, willingness or ability of [the defendant] to carry out the terms of the 
stipulation." United States v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
~ 73,751, at 91,183 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
101. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 46 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D. Del. 1942), appeal 
dismissed, 318 U.S. 796 (1943); see also Chrysler Corp. v. United States, 316 U.S. 556, 570 
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("A court of equity is not just an umpire between two liti-
gants. In a very special sense, the public interest is in its keeping as the conscience of the 
law."); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 194 (1939) ("It is familiar doctrine that the 
extent to which a court of equity may grant or withhold its aid, and the manner of moulding its 
remedies, may be affected by the public interest involved."); 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 
("As a judicial act, the consent decree constitutes determination by the court that its content is 
equitable and in the public interest."). 
102. Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146 (1888). 
103. The fact that the court is to protect the public interest rather than some private inter-
ests provides additional support for intense review, since the court's inherent equitable powers 
reach a maximum when the public interest is involved. See Virginian Ry. v. System Fedn., 
No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) ("Courts of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther 
both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed 
to go when only private interests are involved."). 
104. Additional support for the proposition that the Sam Fox standard would be inappro-
priate to consent decree approval can be found by analyzing the wording of.the statute itself. 
First, the public interest determination is mandatory. 15 U.S.C. § l6(e) (1982); see also 119 
CONG. REC. 3453 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). Neither the statute nor the congressional 
reports indicate that a court should only evaluate a decree in instances where "bad faith" is 
claimed. Second, the general phrasing of the statutory mandate, which requires a court to 
deny entry of any Justice Department proposal not in the public interest, is inconsistent with 
an approach that would limit judicial review to decrees allegedly negotiated in bad faith. 
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sent decree that violates the public interest as a result of an error by 
the Justice Department does not become less undesirable merely be-
cause the government negotiated it in good faith. 
Ill. POTENTIAL DISADVANTAGES OF INTENSE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Commentators105 and courts106 have posited two disadvantages 
that could ensue from intense judicial review. First, they have ar-
gued that intense review will undermine the consent decree's effec-
tiveness as a device for the enforcement of the antitrust laws by 
destroying the incentives to settle without trial. 107 Second, they have 
argued that, as a practical matter, the courts lack the ability to make 
an independent determination of the public interest. 108 Neither of 
these objections provides a sufficient reason to reject intense judicial 
review of proposed decrees. Indeed, intense judicial review may 'ac-
tually improve the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. 
A. Reduced Incentives To Settle 
If the incentive for settlement actually decreased as the intensity 
of judicial review of proposed settlements increased, judicial defer-
ence to the Justice Department would be appropriate. The Depart-
ment's antitrust enforcement depends heavily on the consent decree 
device. 109 Because it involves a settlement, a consent decree can fur-
ther the goals of antitrust policy110 at a significant savings of time 
105. See, e.g., Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an l'?flationary Era, 50 N.Y. U. L, 
REV. 211, 239 (1975). 
106. See note 107 infra; cf. City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825, 835 (9th 
Cir. 1964) (discussing administrative advantages of nolo contendere pleas in criminal cases and 
classifying such pleas with consent decrees). 
107. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 715 (D. Mass. 1975); Hand-
ler, supra note I 05, at 243 ( expressing the concern that the elaborate APPA procedures "cannot 
but have a chilling effect on the normal processes of settling a civil action"). 
108. See, e.g., S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 71 (statement of Robert A. Ham-
mond III, attorney). 
109. See note 3 supra. 
110. The Judgments Section of the Antitrust Division follows these broad purposes in de-
veloping decrees: 
(I) To prohibit past illegal activities; (2) To prevent future violations of the antitrust laws; 
(3) To restore competitive conditions; and (4) To deprive the defendants of the fruits of 
their illegal acts. 
Kilgore,Antitrust Judgments and 17zeir Eeforcement, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 331,338 
(Section of Antitrust Law, ABA 1958). In light of the APPA provisions, the purpose "to pro-
tect the public interest" might be an appropriate addition to this list. 
The consent decree is unique as an antitrust enforcement device because it can actually "go 
beyond sheer prohibition; it can attempt to shape remedies to the requirements of industrial 
order. . . . It can reach beyond the persons in legal combat to comprehend all the parties to 
an industry." W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, supra note 3, at 88. See also 1959 REPORT, supra note 
2, at 19. 
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and resources for the Department and for the judiciary.111 Thus, the 
costs to the public of disincentives to settle would be substantial. 
1. Settlement Risks and Costs 
The relative effects of independent and thorough judicial review 
on incentives to settle are, however, minimal. For defendants, con-
sent decrees represent a less costly, less time consuming, and less 
disruptive alternative to litigation. 112 Further, by negotiating a settle-
ment, the defendant avoids the risks associated with litigation, 113 
most significantly, the prima facie effect of a govemmeD'.t judgment 
in subsequent private treble damage suits. 114 These incentives to set-
tle will be largely unaffected by the intensity of the court's review. 
Nor does intense judicial review in itself increase the costs of set-
tlement, thereby reducing the incentive to settle. The APJ> A public 
notice procedures may increase the cost that accompanies a consent 
settlement, 115 but these procedures must be complied with regardless 
of the scope of the court's review. 116 Any additional costs unique to 
intense judicial review are not likely to be substantial. 117 
2. Equivalency of Relief 
A disincentive to settle might also arise if the court substituted its 
view of what would be proper final relief after a litigated judgment 
for the Department's view of proper negotiated relief. Were the 
court to condition its approval of a consent decree on the defendant's 
acceptance of the court's relief, the defendant, from the point of view 
of relief, would be no worse than if it had litigated and lost. The 
defendant might therefore prefer to litigate instead of settle, gaining 
111. One study suggests that consent decrees are entered in less than half the time it takes 
fully to litigate an action. Barnes, supra note 3, at 237. 
112. Kalodner, supra note 3, at 285; see also M. GOLDBERG, supra note 3, at 3. 
113. Kalodner, supra note 3, at 285. 
114. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982), provides that a judgment 
against a defendant in a public civil antitrust suit shall be prima facie evidence of antitrust 
violations in subsequent private treble damage actions. This prima facie effect does not apply 
to decrees entered before any testimony is taken. Consent decrees normally are entered with 
no record and typically state that no evidence has been taken. See Kalodner, supra note 3, at 
320 n.22; note 74 supra. 
115. See Branfman, supra note 30, at 352-53; see also id. at 329 n.94 (Branfman notes that 
the filing of comments by third parties increased the time between filing and approval by over 
two months on the average. Presumably, defendants would incur costs during the delay.). 
116. See United States v. Central Contracting Co., 527 F. Supp. 1101 (E.D. Va. 1981) 
(court will not make any public interest determination until parties comply with the APPA 
procedural requirements). 
117. According to one study, consent decrees are entered in less than half the time it takes 
to litigate an action fully. See note 111 supra. Given this enormous time differential, it is 
unlikely that intense judicial review will greatly reduce the cost advantages of settlement, since 
a court's review of a proposed decree is unlikely to take a long time. See also S. HEARINGS ON 
APP A, supra note 25, at 116 (statement of Sen. Gurney). 
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at least the possibility of victory at trial. 118 
This argument, however, overlooks three considerations. First, a 
proper application of an intense scope of review would not contain 
this fault. Although Congress intended courts to be able to substi-
tute their views of the public interest in the decree for the Depart-
ment's, 119 it did not intend courts to insist on litigated rather than 
negotiated relief. Accordingly, it commanded that the court "pre-
serve the consent decree as a viable option."120 Second, the strongest 
incentive to settle121 - freedom from the prima facie effect of a fully 
litigated government judgment in future private treble damage ac-
tions -is unaffected by the scope of judicial review. Thus, even if a 
defendant were confronted with the equivalent of a litigated judg-
ment in the consent decree, the absence of the prima facie effect, 
coupled with the cost saving of settlement, would often lead the de-
fendant to opt for settlement instead of trial. 122 Third, the goal of 
settlement is not an absolute one. The very purpose of judicial re-
view is to ensure that settlements in conflict with the public interest 
are not entered. If the Justice Department can negotiate only a bad 
settlement, then the public interest will be better served by a trial on 
the merits. 123 Congress has nowhere expressed an intention to en-
courage a court to accept an improper settlement as a means of pre-
serving the consent decree as a settlement option. 124 
118. Handler, supra note 105, at 241. 
I 19. See notes 53-66 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the court cannot make 
changes in the proposed decree without the consent of the parties. See note 2 supra; cf. text at 
note 9 supra (court conditioned its approval of consent decree on parties' acceptance of 
modifications). 
120. 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS at 6539 (quoting 1973 SENATE REPORT,supra note 5, at 6). The phrase "public interest" 
as used in the APPA includes "compromises made for non-substantive reasons inherent in the 
process of settling cases through the consent decree procedure." 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra 
note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1914 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 6542. 
121. M. GOLDBERG, supra note 3, at 3; 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 ("It is clear that 
the substantial immunity from private antitrust actions is a primary consideration in defen-
dants' willingness to negotiate consent decrees."). 
122. See, e.g., United States v. Gillette Co., 406 F. Supp. 713, 716 n.2 (D. Mass. 1975), 
where the parties "agreed that the court was not to weigh as one element of the settlement the 
possibility that the government might have lost on the merits at trial. The decree is to be tested 
on the basis of the relief provided, on the assumption that the government would have won." 
Indeed, some defendants have consented to decrees that went beyond the relief the govern-
ment could have obtained at trial, given the judicial precedents at that time. 1959 REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 19; se~ e.g., United States v. A.B. Dick Co., 1948-1949 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
~ 62,233, at 62,359 (N.D. Ohio 1948). InA.B. Dick Co., the consent decree contained a provi-
sion for royalty-free patent licensing, even though courts did not grant such relief in a litigated 
judgment until several years later. See Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust 
Enforcement, 18 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 34, 49-50 (1950). This phenomenon suggests that 
factors other than the severity of the relief embodied in the decree play a major role in defen-
dants' decisions to settle. 
123. Zimmer & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 215-16. 
124. The Senate and the House recognized that: 
[T]he court must have broad discretion to acco=odate a balancing of interests. On the 
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Intense judicial review does not affect the defendant's incentives 
to settle. Thus, close judicial scrutiny of the terms of proposed con-
sent decrees will not eviscerate the viability of consent decrees as an 
alternative to trial. 
B. Inadequate Knowledge 
A second reason advanced against intense judicial review is the 
court's inability, as a practical matter, to determine accurately the 
public interest. 125 Not only does the court typically lack expertise in 
the complex field of antitrust law, 126 but it may also be ignorant of 
certain administrative factors127 that motivated the Justice Depart-
ment to settle its case. Given the paucity of the court's knowledge, 
the argument goes, judicial deference is the better part of judicial 
wisdom. 
1. Substantive Knowledge 
The argument concerning the court's lack of knowledge fails at 
the start by ignoring the effect of the APP A; the Act enables a court, 
with the cooperation of the Justice Department, to obtain enough 
knowledge to stand as an informed representative of the public inter-
est. Congress designed the APP A public comment procedures spe-
cifically to remedy any lack of judicial expertise.128 A court can use 
the public comments received during the APP A public notice period 
one hand, the court must obtain the necessary information to make its determination that 
the proposed decree is in the public interest. On the other hand, it must preserve the 
consent decree as a viable settlement option. 
1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 8, reprinted in 1914 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS at 
6538-39 (quoting 1973 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6). 
125. See, e.g., S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 71 (statement of James S. Camp-
bell, attorney). 
126. See s. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 151 (testimony of J. Skelly Wright, 
Judge, United States Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit) ("On the other hand ... antitrust litiga-
tion is very complex litigation. Most Federal judges serve a lifetime on the bench without 
trying one [antitrust] case and, consequently, they are really ignorant of the issues and even the 
law, to some extent, involved in antitrust cases."); see also United States v. Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (court forced to rely on stipulations of parties 
and the assurances of the Justice Department that proposed decree protected the public inter-
est in accordance with congressional design). 
127. These factors typically include 
the strength of the case on the law and the facts; the amount of resources that would be 
tied up in full preparation for trial and in subsequent legal proceedings; the desirability or 
necessity of obtaining significant relief rapidly; the value of any added increment of relief 
that full litigation might produce as compared to the value of the alternative enforcement 
efforts that could be carried out instead; and the effect that consent to a particular decree 
might have on other cases, present and future, that are or might be arguably similar. 
Letter from Donald F. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice, to Rep. 
Emanuel Celler,reprintedin ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 297, at X-2 (Mar. 17, 
1967). 
128. See 119 CONG. REC. 24,600 (1973) (statement of Sen. Gurney). The public comment 
procedure is designed to generate information that will improve the court's ability to evaluate 
the decree from the perspective of the public interest. See note 11 supra. 
' 
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to educate itself about the effects of a proposed decree. 129 Congress 
also provided various discretionary130 procedural devices, such as 
calling expert witnesses or appointing a special master, 131 which the 
court can freely use to assist itself in making a competent determina-
tion of the public interest. 132 
Although a court will be able to use the APP A procedures to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the relief negotiated by the parties, crit-
ics of intense judicial review urge that the court lacks the knowledge 
to determine whether a proposed decree is a good settlement without 
investigating the relative strengths of the parties' legal positions. 133 
Such an investigation of the government's chances of success at trial 
might result in an extensive "minitrial" of the issues. 134 The court 
might then frustrate the goal of rapid relief135 and might reduce in-
centives to settle.136 
These effects, however, will probably be minimal. A "minitrial" 
still will be less costly and less time consuming than a full-scale 
trial.137 The defendant's strongest incentive to settle - avoidance of 
the prima facie effect138 - remains intact. Also, the problem does 
not even arise when the Justice Department reveals to the court the 
reasons behind its willingness to accept less than the remedy it had 
originally sought.139 Presumably, the Department would be even 
more diligent in doing so in the face of intense judicial review. 
2. Resource Allocation 
The court's lack of knowledge may create a second problem. The 
court cannot match the expertise of the Attorney General in the 
management and allocation of the Justice Department's resources. 140 
129. Senator Gurney stated that "[t]he extra time and additional information that the bill 
thus requires is for the purpose of encouraging, and in some cases soliciting additional infor-
mation and public comment that will assist the court in deciding whether the decree should be 
granted." 119 CONG. REc. 24,600 (1973). 
130. ll8 CONG. REC. 31,675 (1972) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
131. 15 U.S.C. § 16(f)(l)-(2) (1982). 
132. Senator Tunney emphasized the importance of the interplay between these proce-
dures and the court's public interest review when he stated that "in a very few complex cases, 
failure to use some of the procedures might give rise to an indication that the district court had 
failed to exercise its discretion properly." 119 CONG. REc. 3453 (1973). 
133. See notes 125-27 supra and accompanying text. 
134. S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 78 (statement of James S. Campbell, 
attorney). 
135. Id. 
136. See text at note I 18 supra. 
137. See note ll7 supra. 
138. See notes 121-22 supra and accompanying text. 
139. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ABA, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREE MANUAL 5 
(1979). 
140. H. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 142 (statement of Miles W. Kirkpatrick, 
attorney). 
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Factors such as the potential strain on the Department's capabilities 
of litigating a particular case might prompt the government to accept 
a less-than-ideal settlement in order to free its resources for use else-
where. A settlement that appears inadequate in isolation could pro-
duce a net gain for society by improving the overall efficiency of 
antitrust enforcement.141 A court's denial of approval could frus-
trate the Department's efficiency. 
Even granting the theory of this argument, 142 any misallocation 
of resources caused by intense judicial review is likely to be insignifi-
cant. A court's denial of approval will result in substantial realloca-
tion of resources only if a trial ensues. But the court's denial of 
approval does not necessarily mean that a trial must follow. Each of 
the parties to a proposed consent decree manifests its willingness, if 
not its desire, to settle143 the case, and renegotiation of the settlement 
by the parties to make the decree compatible with the public interest 
would remain a viable alternative to litigation. 144 
If renegotiation proves unproductive, the Justice Department 
could dismiss a case in the face of a court's denial of a proposed 
decree. 145 Such dismissals need not jeopardize effective antitrust en-
141. H. HEARINGS ON APPA,supra note 54, at 127 (statement of Howard R. Lurie, Profes-
sor of Law). 
142. Zimmer and Sullivan, supra note 3, at 207, point out that there are numerous theoreti-
cal and practical defects in the administrative process that at least make it doubtful whether 
the Justice Department is the best judge of its own resource allocation. Intense judicial review, 
therefore, conceivably would improve the efficiency of the enforcement of the antitrust laws. 
Nevertheless, there is no necessary dichotomy between decisions made by the courts and by 
the Justice Department: The legislative history of the APPA should make the courts sensitive 
to the efficient allocation of the Department's resources in making their public interest deter-
minations. The phrase "public interest" as used in the APPA includes "compromises made for 
nonsubstantive reasons inherent in the process of settling cases through the consent decree 
procedure." 1973 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
Ao. NEWS at 6542. The courts should regard the proper allocation of the Justice Department's 
resources as one such nonsubstantive factor. 
143. See JJT .Dividend, supra note 96, at 614 n.132. 
144. For examples under the APPA where the parties have returned to the bargaining 
table at the request of the court and have come back with an acceptable settlement, see 
Branfman, supra note 30, at 350 n.180. 
145. Two courts recently held that the APPA procedures do not apply to stipulated dismis-
sals. In In re International Business Machs. Corp., 687 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1982), the circuit 
court granted a writ of mandamus directing the district court to cease consideration of the 
question whether the APPA applies to a stipulated dismissal. The circuit court found no indi-
cation in the Act itself or in the legislative history that Congress intended the APPA to apply to 
dismissals. 687 F.2d at 601-02. Indeed, as the following dialogue indicates, the bill's sponsor 
thought of stipulated dismissals as an alternative to settlements falling within the scope of the 
APPA: 
MR. HUTCHINSON. Would any kind of consent decree need to have the court's 
approval? 
MR. TUNNEY. Right. 
MR. HUTCHINS. Would any kind of agreement made outside the court privately stand? 
MR. TUNNEY. Well, I certainly do not think so. / suppose the Justice .Department could 
drop the suit. That would be a third alternative. Otherwise the Justice Department could 
proceed with the litigation or come in with a new consent [decree] and attempt to get the 
Judge's approval of that decree. 
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forcement. Dismissals entered without prejudice do not prevent sub-
sequent administrations from initiating litigation to regulate and 
restrain continuing anticompetitive behavior of the defendant. 146 
But the reluctance of courts to modify any consent decree once it is 
entered147 means that inadequate injunctive provisions embodied in 
a decree will operate in perpetuity and may in effect foreclose further 
regulation of the defendant's practices. 148 On balance, then, a dis-
missal might be preferable to entry of an ineffective consent 
decree. 149 
In fact, the prospect of judicially imposed renegotiations or 
subsequent "voluntary" dismissal could improve the Justice Depart-
ment's performance in effectuating antitrust policies. The 
knowledge that a court will closely scrutinize the terms of a proposed 
settlement provides an incentive for the Justice Department to exer-
cise care150 in arriving at a settlement in the first place. 151 The 
H. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 54, at 43 (emphasis added). Several other witnesses testi-
fied to the same effect. 687 F.2d at 602. 
In United States v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. 547 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Cal. 
1982), the district court similarly concluded that the APPA did not apply to a stipulated dis-
missal. Besides relying on the legislative history of the APPA, the court advanced three addi-
tional arguments. First, the court explained that "to apply the APPA to dismissals would be to 
disregard the apparent understanding of Congress as to the then-existing judicial practice re-
garding consent decrees and the effect of the changes being made. Prior to the passage of the 
APP A, entry of consent decrees was already considered to be a judicial act requiring the 
judge's approval." 547 F. Supp. at 401; see 1973 SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 5. In 
contrast, stipulated dismissals are ordinarily entered without the need for court approval. FED, 
R. CIV. P. 4l(a)(l). Congress' understanding that no major changes were being made cannot 
be reconciled with inclusion of dismissals within the coverage of the APPA. 547 F. Supp. at 
401. Second, dismissals entered without prejudice do not bar later administrations from rein-
stituting suit. An effective suit later is preferable to approval of an inadequate settlement now, 
a settlement that could hinder subsequent attempts by different administrations to regulate the 
defendant's behavior. 547 F. Supp. at 400-01. Finally, application of the APPA to dismissals 
could violate the constitutional separation of powers. Nothing less than a clear congressional 
mandate should lead a court to wade through such a "constitutional morass." 547 F. Supp. at 
401. 
146. United States v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 399, 400-01 
(N.D. Cal. 1982). 
147. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932) ("Nothing less than a clear 
showing of grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us to. change 
what was decreed after years of litigation with the consent of all concerned."). See also notes 
79-83 supra and accompanying text. 
148. See 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
149. See S. HEARINGS ON APPA,supra note 25, at 76-77 (statement of James S. Campbell, 
attorney). 
150. The Justice Department, for instance, may be less likely to "compromise[ ) its eco-
nomic objectives for the sake of expediency," 1959 REPORT, supra note 2, at 303, if it thinks the 
court would not approve of such concessions. The Department might also be less likely to 
"knuckl[e) under'' to the defendants, as the Supreme Court found the Department had done in 
Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. 129, 141 {1967) (decree 
completely failed to remedy the situation found to violate the antitrust laws). See also United 
States v. First Natl. Bank & Trust Co., 280 F. Supp. 260, 263 (E.D. Ky. 1967) ("about a ninety 
percent capitulation" by the Justice Department), qffd. mem. sub nom. Central Bank & Trust 
Co. v. United States, 391 U.S. 469 (1968). When it enacted the APPA, Congress was particu-
larly concerned about decrees that commentators deemed "devoid of merit" (referring to the 
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court's status as a disinterested party in the litigation allows it objec-
tively to assess the relationship between the decree and the public 
interest. And the resources available to it under the APPA 152 enable 
the court to educate itself about the decree to ensure that the decree 
promotes the goals of antitrust policy by protecting the public 
interest. 
CONCLUSION 
No practical or theoretical obstacle limits a court's power or abil-
ity to evaluate intensely and independently consent decrees proposed 
as settlements of public, civil antitrust suits. By using the tools at its 
disposal under the APP A, the court can stand as an informed repre-
sentative of the public and as an effective check against errors made 
by the Justice Department in negotiating settlements. The congres-
sional intent for the APPA, the importance of consent decrees in an-
titrust enforcement, and the significance of antitrust settlements to 
the public at large all demand that courts accept their equitable and 
statutory responsibility to enter as judgments only consent decrees 
that protect the public interest. This responsibility calls for in-
dependent and intense review of proposed decrees. 
infamous AT&T-Western Electric decree entered in 1956) and "blatantly inequitable and im-
proper." See 119 CONG. REC. 24,598 (1973) (statement of Sen. Tunney). 
151. See S. HEARINGS ON APPA, supra note 25, at 148. 
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(f) (1982). 
